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Abstract  
Are the unemployed in South Africa ‘pricing themselves out of the labour market;’? This paper 
explores this proposition through an analysis of reservation wages in Cape Town’s working class 
district of Khayelitsha/Mitchell’s Plain. It argues that reservation wages are not out of line with 
predicted wages. This, in turn, suggests that unemployment in the area is not attributable to job 




Unemployment is a major problem in South Africa. According to the September 2003 
Labour Force Survey, South Africa’s unemployment rate was 28.2% (including only 
active job seekers) and 41.8% (if discouraged job seekers are included). As no 
significant welfare provision is available for adults of working age in South Africa, it is 
unsurprising that there is a strong correlation between unemployment, inequality and 
poverty (Leibbrandt et al, 2001, Leibbrandt and Woolard, 2001; Seekings, 2003a 2003b; 
Seekings and Nattrass, 2005 forthcoming).  
There is, however, some suspicion that measured unemployment is simply too high 
to be believable (see e.g. Standing et al, 1996 and a review of the debate in Nattrass, 
2000). Two persistent concerns are that labour-market surveys must somehow be 
counting as ‘unemployed’ people who really are working, and/or including as 
unemployed those who have ‘priced themselves out of the market’ by setting their 
reservation wages (i.e. the lowest wage they would be prepared to accept) unrealistically 
high.  
This paper sheds light on this issue by using data from a representative survey of the 
Khayelitsha/Mitchells Plain (KMP) Magisterial District in Cape Town. The KMP 
survey was conducted in 2000/1 amongst 1,176 households and 2,644 adults (the 
survey sought to interview every person aged 18 years or older in each household - see 
Crankshaw et al, 2001 for details on the sampling methodology). Of the surveyed 
individuals, 69% were African, 30% were Coloured (mixed race) and the remaining 1% 
comprised insignificant numbers of white and Indian people. Only African and 
Coloured respondents are included in this analysis.    
The KMP survey was designed specifically to explore various dimensions of labour-
market attachment and behaviour (Nattrass, 2002). It covered the predominantly 
Coloured area of Mitchell’s Plain and the African townships of Khayelitsha, Gugulethu 
and Langa. It is thus not a representative sample of the Cape Town metropolitan area - 
but rather of working class (predominantly African and Coloured) Cape Town.  The 
data set is available for public use in the Data First Resource Centre in the Centre for 
Social Science Research at the University of Cape Town.  
This paper starts off with a discussion of the measurement and definition of 
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unemployment made possible by the KMP data. This is followed by an analysis of 
reservation wages and the factors influencing them. The final section presents an 
exploratory analysis of the relationship between reservation wages and predicted wages. 
It suggests that reservation wages are not out of line with predicted wages. This, in turn, 
suggests that unemployment in working class Cape Town is not attributable to job 
seekers having unrealistically high reservation wages.    
 
1. UNEMPLOYMENT IN KMP 
 
The international standard labour force approach (as developed by the International 
Conference of Labour Statisticians (ICLS) - see below) allocates all individuals above a 
certain minimum age to one of three mutually exclusive and exhaustive labour-market 
categories: the employed (defined as people engaged in productive activity either for the 
market or their own consumption for an hour or more a week); the unemployed (those 
wanting and seeking work); and non-labour-force participants. This is done according 
to a set of priority rules which first identify the employed, then the unemployed, and 
finally the non-labour-force participants (i.e. the residual). In terms of this approach, 
someone who describes him or herself as unemployed and looking for work, but who 
also reports that he or she has engaged in some productive activity during the given 
reference period, will be classified as employed rather than unemployed.  
In terms of the labour force approach codified by the (ICLS)), the unemployed 
comprise those above a certain minimum working age who are 1) ‘without work’ (i.e. 
have not been classified as ‘employed’); 2) are ‘currently available for work’ (either paid 
employment or self-employment during the reference period); and 3) are ‘seeking work’ 
i.e. had ‘taken specific steps in a specified recent period to seek paid employment or 
self-employment’ (ICLS, 1982, par. 10). People satisfying these three criteria fall into 
the ‘strict’ or ‘narrow’ international standard definition of unemployment. It is worth 
noting that seeking work is understood fairly broadly to include: taking specific steps to 
find work which may include ‘registration at a public or private employment exchange; 
application to employers; checking at worksites, farms, factory gates, market or other 
assembly places; placing or answering newspaper advertisements; seeking assistance of 
friends or relatives; looking for land, building, machinery or equipment to establish own 
enterprise; arranging for financial resources; applying for permits and licences, etc.’ (ibid, 
par. 10.1.c). 
An alternative ‘broad’ or ‘expanded’ definition of unemployment drops the third 
requirement - i.e. that the unemployed must be seeking work. The ICLS notes that this 
broader definition may be appropriate ‘in situations where the conventional means of 
seeking work are of limited relevance, where the labour market is largely unorganised or 
of limited scope, where labour absorption is, at the time, inadequate or where the 
labour force is largely self-employed’ (ibid, par. 10.2).   
Both the strict and broad definitions require that the unemployed person be 
‘available’ for work. This is typically understood as referring to when the person could 
take up the job - and /or what hours they are prepared to work. However, the ICLS 
suggests that ‘appropriate tests’ may be developed to explore the nature of availability. 
When labour-market conditions indicate that a broad notion of unemployment is most 
suitable: ‘Such tests may be based on notions such as present desire for work and 
previous work experience, willingness to take up work for wage or salary on locally 
prevailing terms, or readiness to undertake self-employment activity given the necessary 
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resources and facilities’ (par. 14.4).   
By suggesting that one could test to see whether a person will accept a job at a 
particular wage, the ICLS is opening the door for a greater consistency between the 
labour force approach to labour supply, and the conventional economic theory of 
labour supply as a positive function of the wage (Nattrass, 2002). However, such tests 
are more easily suggested than implemented. An obvious problem is that in the real 
world there is no single ‘prevailing’ wage. Indeed, prevailing wages are likely to vary 
across regions, across industries and across different skill bands.  
The KMP survey was designed in part to explore, and expand on, the different ways 
of measuring unemployment discussed above. It probed different kinds of work 
(whether paid or unpaid), job search behaviour and reservation wages (see Nattrass, 
2002 for more detail).  
Following the standard international labour force approach, the first step was to 
allocate employment status to those who reported engaging in productive activities. 
Over three quarters of those who could be classified as ‘working’ in this way were 
regular, full-time wage workers (Nattrass, 2002: 7-10), the rest were casual or part-time 
workers.  
The next step was to define the unemployed. In this regard, the standard labour 
force approach was adapted to take into account the possibility that jobless individuals 
may have decided that searching for employment is best done through networks - i.e. 
relying on friends and relatives to find them jobs - rather than seeking their help or 
other forms of ‘active’ job search. If it is common for people to obtain work through 
social networks, and if it is taken for granted that friends and relatives will keep an 
active look-out for jobs for others (even when not specifically asked to do so), then 
what might appear to be a passive response - i.e. doing nothing but rely on others - 
should rather be re-examined in a different light. As there is a growing body of South 
African literature showing the importance of this method of job search (see e.g. Baber, 
1998; Wittenberg, 1999; Dinkelman and Pirouz, 2001; Wittenberg, 2001; Seekings 2003; 
Dinkelman, 2004; Duff and Fryer, 2004; Schöer, 2004), such an approach is certainly 
worth pursuing.  
The KMP data set allows us to create three new definitions of unemployment: (1) 
the active-searching unemployed; (2) the network-searching unemployed; and (3) the 
marginalised unemployed. Definition 1 amounts to the strict definition of 
unemployment, and definitions 2 and 3 together comprise the broad definition.  
To qualify as an active-searching unemployed person, the respondent must not 
already be defined as ‘employed’ (as described above); must report that he/she wants a 
job and is available for work during week days; and has searched actively for work 
(Nattrass, 2002: 11-12). 
‘Exclusive network searchers’ are defined here as those who are available and willing 
to work, are not taking active steps to find it, but are rather relying on friends and 
relatives to find them work, or to tell them about job opportunities (ibid: 12).    
The marginalised unemployed are defined as those who are ready and willing to 
work, but do not qualify either as active job seekers or as network job-searchers. They 
are thus, in an important sense, ‘marginalised’ from (or in Dinkelman and Pirouz’s 
(2001) terms, they may be said to be less ‘attached’ to) the labour market. One may call 
such individuals ‘discouraged’ job seekers – but as that implies (perhaps) some 
knowledge of their psychological states, this category has simply been labelled as the 
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‘marginalised unemployed’.  
In terms of the above definitions, the unemployment rate in KMP ranges from 
28.4% (strict definition including only the active job seekers) to 35.5% (intermediate 
definition including active job seekers and those relying on networks) and 46.3% 
(including active job seekers, those relying on networks and the marginalised 
unemployed).    
 
2. RESERVATION WAGES 
 
A first step in exploring whether unemployed people are ‘pricing themselves out of the 
labour market’ is to examine their reservation wages – i.e. the highest wage at which 
they would rather ‘choose leisure’ or continued job search rather than work 
(Killingsworth, 1983; Sapsford and Tzannatos, 1993).  
The notion of a reservation wage is simple conceptually, but difficult to measure in 
practice (see overview of international studies in Walker, 2003). It is also difficult to 
learn ‘lessons’ from international studies because the socio-economic context 
profoundly affects reservation wages. Most obviously, one would expect people to have 
higher reservation wages when unemployment and other welfare benefits are available – 
as is the case in Great Britain (e.g. Jones, 1988). In South Africa’s case, the reservation 
wage is more likely to be affected both by the respondent’s perception of their labour-
market value and the degree of desperation they are experiencing for work.    
There have been several previous attempts to measure reservation wages. Using the 
1993 SALDRU survey, Kingdon and Knight (2001) assess the difference between 
reservation wages and predicted wages as a possible route to understanding the nature 
of South African unemployment. They generated predicted wages for the unemployed 
using parameters from the wage functions of employed persons. Their results suggest 
that about 50% of unemployed people have reservation wages that exceed their 
predicted wages - and for about 30% of the unemployed, reservation wages exceed 
predicted wages by more than 40%. Higher reservation wages than predicted wages 
were especially common amongst African respondents, people from rural homelands, 
less-educated workers, females, the young and people who had never worked before.  
Kingdon and Knight are, however, suspicious of these results and list several reasons 
why the reported reservation wages in the SALDRU survey may be unreliable. They 
criticise the survey questions as being too open to wide interpretation and speculate 
that respondents may be reporting their beliefs about a ‘fair’ wage (or a wage they 
would start bargaining at) rather than a genuine reservation wage.  
In trying to improve the reliability of recording reported reservation wages, Dias 
suggests that survey questions should be reformulated as follows:  
 
“If a full-time job is offered to …name… nearby (within 5 kilometres of your residence) would 
…name…accept it if the weekly rate were: (with a range of income categories having been 
provided)?” (2002:18).  
 
She also argues that a question should be asked pertaining to the minimum wage that a 
respondent would accept for doing a casual job as this will help shed light on the extent 
to which “job security can be traded for income” (ibid, 2002:18). A further suggestion 
is that information should be collected on past wages or past wage offers rejected. As 
Dias puts it, “past wages earned may well form a reasonable benchmark for wage 
expectations while past wage offers rejected may substantiate the reservation wage 
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reported” (2002:18).  
The KMP survey had already moved in the direction suggested by Dias (although the 
income range idea and the five kilometre rule was not adopted) - but it went one step 
further by asking respondents about their reaction to specific jobs that were actually 
available in the area. In this regard, it was following the suggestion from the ICLS 
(1982, par.14.4) that appropriate ‘tests’ be included in surveys to understand labour-
market behaviour.  
 
3. RESERVATION WAGES IN KMP 
 
The KMP survey asks several questions about reservation wages (see Table 1), but not 
all respondents answered all questions as some were aimed at specific sub-samples - e.g. 
the employed, non labour force participants etc. All respondents answered question K5: 
“What is the absolute lowest monthly take home wage that you would accept for any 
work (if you were unemployed at the time)?” Questions F24 and F25 were for the 
unemployed only, question G29 was for the self-employed, and I5 and I18 were for 
those who reported having done some casual work.    
There are two striking results in Table 1. The first is the large difference in mean 
response between F24 (which probes the unemployed respondent’s notion of a fair 
wage) and F25 (which asks for his/her reservation wage). This indicates that 
respondents understand the difference between these two wage-related questions (and 
hence that the criticism levelled by Kingdon and Knight (2001) against the reservation 
wage question in the SALDRU survey is probably misplaced).  
The second interesting result is that reservation wages for the self-employed and 
casual workers are substantially higher than those for the unemployed. In the case of 
casual workers, this probably reflects the effect of scaling up a daily rate to a monthly 
rate because one would expect daily rates to be higher for short-term jobs. In the case 
of the self-employed, this may reflect a strong preference for self-employment over 
other forms of employment.  
 
Table 1. Questions in the KMP Survey pertaining to Reservation Wages 
 
Question Number (Number of 
respondents who answered) 




What do you think would be a reasonable take-home monthly 
wage for you given your desired hours of work and your age, 
education, skills, and area of residence etc. 
R1,533 
F25 
N= 1,099 unemployed 
What is the absolute minimum take-home monthly wage below 
which you would not be prepared to work in any job (taking into 





What is the absolute lowest weekly take-home wage you would 
accept if offered a job? 
R2,656 
I5 
N=1,241 respondents who would like 
to do casual work occasionally 
What is the lowest daily take-home wage you would be prepared 
to accept for a casual job? 
R2,319 
I18 
N= 353 respondents who have actually 
done casual work in the past six months 
What is the lowest daily take-home wage you would be prepared 
to accept for a casual job? 
R2,930 
K5 
N=2,267 (all respondents) 
What is the absolute lowest monthly take home wage that you 




In the analysis that follows, K5 is used as the reservation wage measure. Not only did 
this question have the greatest number of observations, but there are good reasons to 
believe that K5 is a reliable measure of reservation wages. Firstly, the mean reservation 
wage for the employed (R1,319) was (as one would expect) substantially lower than the 
mean after-tax wage reported by the employed (R1,720). Secondly, for those few (39) 
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unemployed respondents who reported having actually turned down wage offers, this 
was, for the vast majority, consistent with higher reported reservation wages (Nattrass, 
2002: 18-23; Walker, 2003: 21-23). Thirdly, the answers of most respondents to K5 are 
consistent with their responses to hypothetical job offers - i.e. they accepted the offer if 
the wage was higher than K5, and they rejected it if the wage was lower than K5. This 
is depicted in more detail in Table 2. Note, however, that an inconsistent answer does 
not necessarily imply some kind of economic irrationality as the respondent is being 
asked to consider the type of job as well as the wage. Nevertheless, the fact that 
answers to K5 are consistent with the answers given to the hypothetical job offers, 
suggests that K5 can be regarded as a reliable measure of reservation wages.  
 
Table 2. Hypothetical Job Offers 
 
Question Number Question Consistency of answers with K5 
Imagine that an industrial park opened up nearby.  
Would you accept any of the following jobs at the 
following (pre-tax)* rates of pay  
(if you were unemployed at the time): 
Consistent 
a) K5>offer and offer 
refused 
b) K5< offer and offer 
accepted 
Inconsistent 
a) K5< offer and offer 
refused 
b) K5>offer and offer 
accepted 

















* None of these wages are within a taxable bracket.  
 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression can help isolate the factors affecting 
reservation wages for labour-market participants:  
log(reservation wage) = c + β1X1 + β2X2 +… βiXi + ε 
 
All income variables were logged to control for any scale effects resulting from the wide 
variation in these variables. Household per capita income was included in the regression 
model on the grounds that it was probable that job seekers in better-resourced 
households were less likely to accept low-wage work out of desperation than those 
living in poorer households. Following Skordis and Welch (2002), household income 
was estimated by aggregating individual income in the household. This was then 
divided by household size to obtain per capita household income.   
Klasen and Woolard (2000) found that age, gender, race and education had a large 
and significant impact on reservation wages. We thus included these variables in our 
analysis. 1   
Duration of unemployment is also likely to matter for reservation wages. However, 
the relationship between duration of unemployment and reservation wage is complex. 
If, for example, the long-term unemployed are choosing to stay unemployed longer in 
order to wait for better job offers, then presumably they have the financial resources to 
finance this - and thus may report higher reservation wages than the short-term 
unemployed (Jones, 1988). If, however, the long-term unemployed experience some 
depreciation in their human capital and adjust their perceptions of their market value 
accordingly, then there will be a negative relationship between the duration of 
                                                     
1 An age-squared variable was included in an earlier regression to test a possible quadratic 
relationship between age and reservation wage - but was found to be insignificant and discarded 
from the analysis.  
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unemployment and the reservation wage (Prasad, 2000:45; Holzer, 1985). But it is also 
possible that the longer people stay out of wage employment, the less able they become 
to ascertain their market value correctly. They may thus set unrealistically high 
reservation wages. In the regression analysis presented here (see Table 3) we include the 
duration of unemployment in months (logged) and its square in order to test for a 
possible quadratic relationship between unemployment duration and the reservation 
wage. 
Finally, we included a measure of work experience on the grounds that those who 
have worked before are in a better labour-market position than those who have not – 
and thus can set higher reservation wages. We created a variable called ‘working life’ 
that ranges from 0 (if the respondent reports that he or she has spent no time since 
leaving school in wage employment) to 4 (the respondent reports that he or she has 
spent all of his or her time since leaving school in wage employment).    
Table 3 presents a set of regressions on the log of the reservation wage. Regression 1 
includes all labour-market participants, regression 2 looks at the (broadly defined) 
unemployed, and regression 3 at the employed (whether wage-employed, self-employed 
or casual-employed) only. As expected, the regressions show that men have higher 
reservation wages than women (20% higher in regression 1), and that older people have 
higher reservation wages than younger people.  Race was also significant in all models, 
with Coloured respondents having on average reservation wages 25% higher 
(regression 1) than Africans.  This no doubt in part reflects the legacy of the Coloured 
Labour Preference policy in the Western Cape (which ensured preferential access to 
skilled jobs and training opportunities for Coloured workers).     
 
Table 3. Determinants of the (Log of) Reservation Wages 
 























































N 1499 623 876 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1694 0.1056 0.1619 
Notes: Numbers in [ ] are the standard error 
* Significant at the 10% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, *** Significant at the 1% level 
  
Working life (i.e. the variable indicating the extent to which respondents spent time 
since leaving school in wage employment) was marginally significant for the full sample, 
but not in regressions 2 and 3. Years of education were positively associated with 
reservation wages in all regressions. Whether the respondent had a university or 
technical education mattered for the full sample (employed plus unemployed) and for 
the employed, but did not exercise a statistically significant impact on the reservation 
South African Journal of Economics  Vol. 73:3  September 2005© 
© 2005 Economic Society of South Africa.  505
wages of the sample containing only the unemployed.  
Duration of unemployment exercised a negative impact on the reservation wage - 
although the significance of the quadratic term indicates that the relationship turned 
positive for the very long-term unemployed. This is consistent with the hypothesis that 
reservation wages decline as the duration of unemployment increases (maybe because 
people become increasingly desperate and/or discount their human capital over time) - 
but that this relationship changes its sign for the very long-term unemployed (perhaps 
because they lose perspective as to what an appropriate reservation wage is for them).  
It is also possible that the long-term unemployed with high reservation wages are those 
who can ‘afford’ to be unemployed. However, given Kingdon and Knight’s (2001) 
compelling case against the ‘luxury unemployment’ hypothesis, this proposition seems 
implausible as a general explanation.     
Per capita household income was significantly related to the reservation wage, thus 
suggesting that those living in better-resourced households were probably less desperate 
than those living in poorer households, and thus could set higher reservation wages. 
Interesting though it may be, the discussion so far has yet to shed any light on the 
question as to whether reservation wages in KMP are ‘too high’ or not. To address this 
question, we need to examine reservation wages in relation to predicted wages.   
 
4. RESERVATION WAGES AND PREDICTED WAGES 
 
One way of exploring whether a person’s reservation wage (RW) is ‘out of line’ with his 
or her market value is to divide it by his or her predicted wage (PW) based on personal 
characteristics. Those who have a value greater than 1 could be said to be manifesting 
unrealistic wage expectations.  
Unlike Kingdon and Knight (who generated predicted wages for unemployed 
individuals using parameters from the wage functions of employed persons), we opted 
to use a Heckman maximum likelihood model to generate predicted wages for all 
respondents in the KMP survey. This method entails running an initial probit model to 
predict which respondents would be employed given certain characteristics. Our 
working hypothesis for this ‘selection stage’ of the model was that social capital matters 
for obtaining work - hence the inclusion of ‘head of household’ and ‘urban/rural 
background’2 as explanatory variables. In regression models 1 and 2, we include age, 
education, gender and race as other relevant variables affecting the probability of 
finding a wage job.   
Once the likelihood function is specified, the Heckman selection methodology then 
seeks to find a set of parameters that maximises the likelihood function and generates 
predicted wages for all respondents. We included age and working life as proxies for 
experience as explanatory variables in this ‘outcome’ stage. In regression models 1 and 
3, we also included gender, race and education (as is typical of wage determination 
models for the South African labour market - see e.g. Chamberlain and Van der Berg 
(2002)).  
                                                     
2 As Standing pointed out some time ago, migrants “are likely to have less knowledge of  
prevailing urban wage rates and, possibly with fewer income-sharing contacts on whom to rely, a 
greater need for an income from work, however small” (1978:233). This suggests that a person 
from a rural area will have a lower probability of  securing employment (lack of  contacts, urban 
labour-market experience etc.). 
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Table 4 presents three alternative specifications. Model 1 includes race and gender in 
both the selection and outcome stages, and models 2 and 3 include race and gender 
only in the selection and outcome stages respectively.  Note that race and gender are 
statistically significant in models 2 and 3, but that once they appear in both the 
outcome and selection stages (model 1) these variables are statistically significant only 
in the selection stage. As it seems plausible that gender and race matter both in terms of 
getting a job and determining wages, we opted for model 1 when determining the 
predicted wages to be used later on in the analysis.     
 
Table 4. The Heckman Maximum Likelihood Model   
 
Dependent Variable: ln(wage) 1 2 3 









































Censored 1155 1155 1161 
Uncensored 701 701 701 
LogL -1848.004 -1848.139 -1886.381 







































N 1856 1856 1862 
Wald chi2 29.09 28.75 72.99 
Prob>chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Likelihood ratio test chi2 74.10 131.14 77.69 
Prob>chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
% with RW/PW>1 
(95% confidence interval) 
3.2% 
(2.5% - 4.0%) 
3.3% 
(2.5% - 4.1%) 
2.5% 
(1.8% - 3.2%) 
Mean (RW/PW) 
(95% confidence interval) 
86.2% 
(85.8% - 86.5%) 
86.2% 
(85.8% - 86.5%) 
86.0% 
(85.6% - 86.3%) 
Notes: Numbers in [ ] are the standard error 
* Significant at the 10% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, *** Significant at the 1% level 
 
The likelihood ratio test for model 1 produced a chi-squared statistic of 74.10. Thus, at 
the 1% level one is able to reject the hypothesis that the selection and outcome stages 
are independent. This supports the use of the Heckman approach in generating 
predicted wages. Predicted wages were generated for all respondents (using model 1 in 
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Table 4) including those presently in wage-employment. The predicted wages were 
adjusted by the inverse mills ratio (lambda), to account for the probability of the person 
getting the job.   
A ratio of reservation wage to predicted wage (RW/PW) was then calculated for 
each respondent. As reported in Tables 4 and 5, the mean RW/PW for the total sample 
was 0.862. Only 3.2% (with a 95% confidence interval of 2.5% - 4.0% around this 
estimate) of respondents had RW/PW ratios greater than 1. Table 4 shows that the 
three different specifications of the Heckman selection model produced similar results 
in terms of the mean RW/PW and the proportion of respondents with RW/PW>1.   
 
Table 5.  Reservation Wages (RW) and Predicted Wages (PW) 
 
RW/PW % with RW>PW  
Mean  95% confidence interval Mean 95% confidence interval 
Wage employed 87.5% 87.0% – 88.0% 4.3% 2.8% - 5.6% 
Self-employed 86.7% 85.2% - 88.1% 6.6% 2.6% - 10.6% 
Casual employed 85.8% 83.6% - 88.0% 1.6% -1.6% - 4.9% 
Total employed 87.3% 86.8% - 87.8% 4.5% 3.2% - 5.8% 
Search unemployed 85.5% 84.8% - 86.3% 1.3% 0.2% - 2.4% 
Network searching unemployed 84.7% 83.6% - 86.0% 0.6% -0.6% - 1.9% 
Marginalised unemployed 84.4% 83.4%  -85.4% 1.7% 2.2% - 3.2% 
Total Unemployed  85.0% 84.4% - 85.5% 1.3% 0.5% - 2.1% 
Non labour force participants 90.4% 88.7% - 92.1% 9.1% 1.3% - 16.9% 
Total 86.2% 85.8% - 86.6% 3.2% 2.5% - 4.0% 
 
Table 5 provides information on mean RW/PW ratios (generated by regression 1 in 
Table 4) by labour-market status. The over-lapping confidence intervals for the mean 
RW/PW ratios for different kinds of employment and unemployment indicate that the 
differences were not statistically significant within these two broad categories. 
However, the mean RW/PW for the (total) unemployed was statistically significantly 
lower than that for the (total) employed. The unemployed as a whole also had a 
statistically significantly lower mean PW/PW ratio than was the case for the wage 
employed. This suggests that the unemployed have adjusted their reservation wages 
downwards relative to their employed counterparts.  
 
Table 6. RW/PW and the Probability of being Unemployed as Opposed to Wage Employed 
 











Household head -0.633*** 
[0.083] 
Urban/rural background 0.029 
[0.089] 




LR chi2 253.29 
Prob>chi2 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.1232 
Notes: Numbers in [ ] are the standard error * Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** 
Significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 6 explores the relationship between the RW/PW ratio and unemployment 
further by including RW/PW as an explanatory variable in a regression on the 
probability of being unemployed (as opposed to being wage employed). It shows that 
controlling for age, gender education and race, RW/PW ratios of higher than 1 are 
associated with statistically significantly lower chances of being unemployed. This adds 
further support for the argument made earlier: that there is no evidence that relatively 




In conclusion it is important to stress that this analysis is specific to working class Cape 
Town and cannot be generalised to the country as a whole. The analysis is nevertheless 
instructive in that it is based on an innovative data set that was designed specifically to 
probe some of the puzzling aspects of South African unemployment - including the 
issue of reservation wages. The survey showed that people’s understandings of 
reservation wage questions varied significantly depending on how the question was 
phrased - thus highlighting once again the need for careful survey design and piloting.  
The fact that the reservation wage question used in the analysis presented here was 
consistent with responses to hypothetical job offers (see Table 2) indicates that the 
question was understood largely as intended (and hence that the data is meaningful). 
Our analysis of the RW/PW ratio showed that the overwhelming majority of 
respondents had ratios of less than 1 - i.e. their reservation wages were lower than their 
predicted wages (as generated by a Heckman selection model). Other model 
specifications would no doubt generate different results.  However, the fact that over 
95% of respondents had predicted wages higher than their reservation wages (and that 
this was true for all three specifications presented in Table 4), is extremely interesting.  
At the very least, it suggests that there is no support for the proposition that 
unemployment should be categorised as ‘voluntary’, in working class Cape Town.  
Rather, it appears that people’s reservation wages are realistic given what they could 
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